UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/24333
21 July 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE SITUATION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

INTRODUCTION

1. In a statement made by its President on 17 July 1992 (S/24307), the Security Council welcomed the agreement signed earlier that day in London by the parties to the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina in which the parties, inter alia, asked the Security Council to make arrangements for international supervision of all their heavy weapons (see S/24305, annex). The President's statement recorded the Security Council's decision in principle to respond positively to this request and called upon the parties to declare immediately to the Force Commander of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) the locations and quantities of the heavy weapons to be placed under international supervision. The Council further requested the Secretary-General to report by 20 July on the implementation and resource implications of this decision.

2. The Force Commander of UNPROFOR immediately instructed his Sector Commander in Sarajevo to enter into contact with the representatives of the three parties with a view to identifying the locations and quantities of heavy weapons to be supervised. However, no relevant information was made available by any of the parties, two of whom had, by noon New York time on 21 July 1992, made no response at all to the Force Commander's request. In these circumstances, the Force Commander submitted to me on 19 July 1992 a proposed Concept of Operations for UNPROFOR to supervise the parties' heavy weapons, on the basis of such information as was available to him from public sources. Estimates of the resources required by this Concept of Operations have been prepared by the Force Commander on the basis of experience acquired by UNPROFOR in the course of its deployment in the region. The Force Commander's Concept of Operations is annexed to the present report. Its financial implications are outlined in an addendum which will be circulated separately.

I. PRINCIPAL FEATURES OF THE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

3. The Concept of Operations proposed by General Nambiar envisages the deployment of United Nations military observers (UNMOs) throughout the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, other than Sarajevo, where separate arrangements are already in effect. The UNMOs would supervise, through liaison, monitoring and patrolling, the heavy weapons of all parties to the conflict in that Republic. Some 1,100 UNMOs would be required and they would be based in 62 "equipment-collection points" (ECPs) which would be grouped into seven "patrol areas". Teams of six UNMOs at each ECP would conduct the necessary patrols on a 24-hour-a-day basis.

4. The UNMOs would, to the extent possible, have to be self-sufficient in respect of their accommodation and subsistence. They would require vehicles (three per patrol team in the initial phase), communications equipment, office equipment and working space, and technical and administrative support. A large number of interpreters, and smaller numbers of civil affairs and information personnel would also be necessary, as would adequate arrangements for medical care and the evacuation of casualties.

5. The Force Commander's concept also envisages that the UNMOs would have an important role in helping the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian agencies to identify requirements for humanitarian relief. This is based on the assumption that implementation of the London Agreement would open up access to many areas where there are pressing humanitarian needs and that UNPROFOR would inevitably be expected to help UNHCR and other agencies respond to these needs.

6. The success of such an operation would be impossible without the cooperation of the parties, who would be required to declare all the heavy weapons in their possession and to cooperate with UNPROFOR in concentrating these at locations where they could be monitored. It would also be necessary for the parties to demonstrate a genuine commitment to a sustained and lasting cease-fire and to maintain that commitment largely without international help for several weeks, for reasons explained in paragraph 12 below.

II. OBSERVATIONS

7. After carefully considering the London Agreement and the circumstances in which it was concluded, as well as the advice of the Force Commander, I have come to the conclusion that the conditions do not exist for me to recommend that the Security Council accept the request of the three parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina that the United Nations supervise the heavy weapons which, in the second paragraph of the London Agreement, they have agreed to declare and place under international supervision. This is for a variety of reasons, some of them relating to principle and some to practical considerations.

8. In the first place, the request contained in the London Agreement raises the question of the relationship between the United Nations and regional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security. In "An Agenda for Peace" (S/24111), I have stated my view that their potential should be utilized in serving the functions of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping. Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations describes the role which such arrangements and agencies can play and lays down guidelines for their relationship with the United Nations and specifically with the Security Council. That Chapter underlines the primary responsibility of the Security Council in such matters, providing, for instance, that in certain circumstances it can "utilize" regional organizations or agencies. There is no provision for the reverse to occur. In other instances when the United Nations and a regional organization have both been involved in an international peace and security situation, care has been taken to ensure that the primacy of the world Organization has not been compromised.

9. Secondly, the United Nations did not participate in the negotiation of the London Agreement. Only on the eve of its signature were my staff informed of the request it was likely to contain and given the opportunity to draw attention to the practical constraints on UNPROFOR's ability to carry out this task. It is most unusual for the United Nations to be asked to help implement a politico-military agreement in whose negotiation it has played no part. The London Agreement is thus very different from the United Nations peace-keeping plan in Croatia which was negotiated by the Secretary-General's Personal Envoy, assisted by experienced staff from the Secretariat. As a matter of principle, I believe that such staff should be involved in the negotiation of any agreement which is likely to give rise to a peace-keeping role for the United Nations.

10. My concern on these two points is heightened by the lack of clarity concerning the respective roles of the United Nations and the European Community in implementation of the London Agreement. In its first paragraph, the parties have undertaken to explore measures for strengthening the cease-fire in the longer term. It is not clear whether the European Community would help them to do this (they would certainly not be able to do it without third party help), as part of the follow-up to an agreement mediated by the Community, or whether this role would be performed by the United Nations, which in the second paragraph is asked by the parties to perform a function that would be the main determinant of whether the cease-fire could be strengthened. In order to clarify this and other points, I have asked Lord Carrington to make available to me the records of the London negotiations.

11. Thirdly, it is well established that certain conditions have to exist before a successful peace-keeping operation can be established. These include the consent and cooperation of the parties and a practicable mandate. Neither exists in the present case. The cease-fire which was supposed to begin on 19 July 1992 has not come into effect in Sarajevo or, to judge from media reports, elsewhere in Bosnia and Herzegovina. On the contrary, fighting has intensified to the extent that relief operations through Sarajevo airport had to be suspended on 20 July and again today. None of the parties has declared

to UNPROFOR the quantity and locations of its heavy weapons, information without which the Force Commander cannot begin to plan the additional deployment which would be needed in order to supervise them.

12. Fourthly, the additional function which UNPROFOR is asked to assume is simply beyond the present operational and logistical capability of the United Nations. UNPROFOR is already stretched to the breaking-point, with severe shortages of civilian personnel and of almost all categories of equipment. The Force Commander has told me that he would have neither personnel nor vehicles which he could spare for this new function. Nor do other United Nations peace-keeping operations have spare resources that could be redeployed to Bosnia and Herzegovina. In spite of repeated requests to the General Assembly, the Secretary-General has not been authorized to establish a reserve stock of basic peace-keeping equipment which would enable me to respond quickly to new requirements of this kind. Only a handful of Member States have committed themselves to keep military personnel on stand-by for service in United Nations peace-keeping operations and many of them have already exhausted their reserves of such personnel, as a result of unprecedented demand during the current year. I am advised that in these circumstances it would take at least three months to deploy all the personnel and equipment required to implement the Force Commander's concept. There is reason to doubt whether the parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina would respect the cease-fire for so long a period without their heavy weapons being supervised.

13. Fifthly, there is a question of priorities. The United Nations is already massively engaged in the former Yugoslavia. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees is leading the international effort to deal with the largest humanitarian crisis which has afflicted Europe since the Second World War, with 2.25 million refugees and displaced persons and another 850,000 persons estimated to be trapped in their homes by the fighting. An international conference on this problem is being convened by her on 29 July. UNHCR alone has already provided more than 25,000 tonnes of relief supplies and estimates its total requirements till 31 March 1993 at $141.9 million, of which only $52.1 million has been received so far. On the peace-keeping side, some 13,600 troops are deployed in Croatia, the third largest force ever fielded by the Organization. Their mandate is constantly expanding as experience on the ground brings to light further complexities in implementing the United Nations peace-keeping plan. In Sarajevo another major operation has been mounted, at great risk to the security of the personnel involved, to reopen the airport for humanitarian relief flights. My concern is that if the Security Council continues to concentrate its attention and resources to such an extent on Yugoslav problems, this will be at the expense of the Organization's ability to help resolve equally cruel and dangerous conflicts elsewhere, e.g. in Somalia.

14. In conclusion, I would like to emphasize that in conveying to the Security Council my view that the conditions do not exist for it to accept the request addressed to it by the parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina, I am not decrying the European Community's achievement in negotiating the London Agreement. Nor am I suggesting any reduction in the existing activities of

the United Nations in the former Yugoslavia. On the contrary, I shall shortly recommend to the Council a further enlargement of UNPROFOR's mandate and strength in the United Nations Protected Areas. Nor, of course, am I questioning the Security Council's right to decide what the response of the United Nations to the London Agreement should be.

Annex

Concept of operations

INTRODUCTION

1. The aim of the present annex is to outline the reinforcement to UNPROFOR required for the extension of its mandate to include the monitoring of a cease-fire in Bosnia and Herzegovina (the London Agreement) (S/24305, annex).

2. It is assumed throughout that:

(a) All parties continue to support the Agreement and that there is no widespread breakdown of the cease-fire before an UNPROFOR deployment;

(b) All sides will agree to concentrate heavy weapons at points agreed with UNPROFOR. Given the large quantity of heavy weapons involved, it will be impossible to monitor them in their current positions;

(c) Sarajevo is not included in the operation. The nature of the task and deployments in the city mean that it will be a separate operation under the command of UNPROFOR headquarters;

(d) If the cease-fire holds, the infrastructure of Bosnia and Herzegovina will be steadily restored;

(e) Implementation of the London Agreement will open access to many areas in urgent need of humanitarian relief and UNPROFOR will inevitably be expected to support the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian agencies.

A. The mission

3. The mission of UNPROFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina (less Sarajevo) is to supervise the parties' heavy weapons as provided for in the London Agreement.

B. Requirements

4. The mission requires:

(a) Establishing equipment collection points (ECPs) for heavy weapons;

(b) Monitoring ECPs;

(c) Monitoring actual and potential trouble spots;

(d) Establishing a United Nations military observer (UNMO) presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina within the time-frame of the London Agreement;

(e) The use of the good offices of the United Nations to maintain the cease-fire;

(f) Assisting UNHCR and other humanitarian agencies to identify requirements for humanitarian relief.

I. FACTORS AFFECTING THE OPERATION

A. The parties

5. Time. The warring parties have agreed to only a 14-day cease-fire.

Deduction: Initial deployment of UNPROFOR must take place as soon as possible, but not later than 2 August 1992 when the initial 14-day agreement expires.

6. Geography. The main areas of conflict (excluding Sarajevo Sector) are the Bihac region, Tuzla region, the Sava River from Derventa to Brcko, Foca to Gorazde, south-eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina, including Dubrovnik to Herceg Novi, central Bosnia and Herzegovina from Jajce to Zenica and the Mostar area. (See map, appendix A.) There are reports of "ethnic cleansing" throughout the remainder of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Note that although in Croatia, Dubrovnik is closely linked to neighbouring areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Deduction: The cease-fire monitoring tasks can be achieved in geographically limited areas, but humanitarian tasks will be required throughout the Republic.

7. Command and control. Experience shows that the parties do not have full control of their forces. To influence the situation, pressure must be applied to all levels throughout the Republic.

Deductions:

(a) There will have to be constant liaison on all sides and at all levels, for example on the Serb side with the Government of the so-called Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, its army headquarters, its corps headquarters and local military commanders and civil leaders;

(b) This is the key part of the operation and must take place as quickly as possible from the top downwards;

(c) Breakdowns in the cease-fire must be anticipated and it may be impossible for UNPROFOR to influence the situation;

(d) To maintain contact with the more "independent" groups, a coordinated television/radio campaign, involving all sides, explaining the roles and mandate of UNPROFOR must be initiated.

B. Infrastructure

8. Movement. Although the infrastructure of Bosnia and Herzegovina was previously well established, there has been significant damage to it and road movement will be difficult in many areas, e.g. most of the bridges across the Neretva River have been destroyed. Many other routes are blocked by landslides or cratering. The extent of minefields is not known but probably extensive. Many areas can be reached only by unimproved tracks but these will be impassable because of the threat from mines.

Deductions:

(a) Operations may be limited by obstacles, liaison must be established with the factions to re-establish links using their own equipment;

(b) Helicopters will be needed for casualty evacuation and quite possibly for routine movement;

(c) United Nations combat engineer support will be needed for minefield clearance in areas where local support is not available;

(d) The inaccessibility of some areas because of the mine threat means that alternative surveillance means are needed, perhaps using air photography (with the agreement of all parties).

9. Communications. Civilian communications are non-existent or unreliable.

Deduction: The operation will require independent communications covering the area of operations and linking the area to the remainder of UNPROFOR.

10. Supplies. There are probably shortages of petrol/oil/lubricants (POL), food, potable water and electricity in the areas of conflict. Should the cease-fire hold, it is assumed that much of the normal civilian infrastructure will be restored; UNMOs will in due course be able to live off the local resources.

Deductions:

(a) Some UNPROFOR logistic support will be required, especially in the early stages of deployment;

(b) Generators with necessary fuel and equipment will be needed throughout the area.

11. Accommodation. May be available, but it is possible that it will be occupied by refugees or destroyed. There may not be any accommodation at ECPs.

Deduction: It is considered that the availability of accommodation will be at its worst at the ECPs. It will be necessary to rapidly concentrate into as few ECPs as possible to minimize this requirement. Such points will have to be selected with the accommodation requirements in mind. However, temporary/permanent accommodation may be required at some sites.

12. Medical. Local medical support is inadequate.

Deduction: UNPROFOR medical support must be used to give first aid, to stabilize casualties and to evacuate them, quite possibly by helicopter.

C. Climate

13. There are great extremes of heat and cold in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The task is unlikely to be completed before the start of winter in October.

Deduction: Cold weather equipment, including quite possibly snow ploughs, will be needed to complete the task in Bosnia and Herzegovina. A reconnaissance must be conducted to identify the requirement well before the start of winter.

II. TASKS AND TYPE OF TROOPS REQUIRED

A. Patrol tasks

14. Tasks required to implement the mission are:

(a) To command the operation;

(b) To liaise with all sides at the appropriate level as soon as possible;

(c) To liaise with all United Nations agencies;

(d) To monitor lines of confrontation;

(e) To establish and monitor the concentration of heavy weapons at ECPs and to patrol extensively to ensure adherence to the agreement;

(f) To patrol actively throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina and identify and report on areas that require humanitarian assistance.

Manning requirements. UNMOs are best able to achieve these tasks. Infantry battalions do not have the necessary skills. (A large number of such units would be needed to achieve the mission.) Limitations on off-road movement means that air reconnaissance may be required.

B. Support operations

15. Support operations required by the mission are:

(a) Route clearance;

(b) Helicopters;

(c) Logistics: see appendix B;

(d) Medical support, based on existing assets with some reinforcement. For details see appendix B;

(e) A quantity of equipment is needed to achieve the mission. For details see appendix B;

(f) A public relations campaign is required, using civil or military personnel from outside UNPROFOR;

(g) Communications equipment will be required which can be operated by UNMOs.

III. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

16. A force of UNMOs will deploy into Bosnia and Herzegovina. Command will be exercised from a forward UNMO headquarters in Bosnia and Herzegovina (HQ UNMO BH) which will report to UNPROFOR headquarters through the Chief Military Observer. Patrol areas will be established throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. These patrol areas will be based on the current areas of conflict and will contain a varying number of patrol teams. Proposed patrol areas are indicated in appendix C. A diagram of the UNMO Bosnia and Herzegovina organization is contained in appendix D. UNMOs will be responsible for the following tasks in order of priority:

(a) To establish liaison with all parties at a high level at the earliest opportunity;

(b) To establish low-level, local liaison;

(c) To control the concentration of heavy weapons;

(d) To patrol actively throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina;

(e) To identify, in conjunction with relevant agencies, requirements for humanitarian relief.

IV. THE PLAN

A. General outline

17. Deployment of the UNMOs into Bosnia and Herzegovina will be in a two-phase operation. It will be impossible to start Phase One without reinforcement of UNPROFOR. The minimum requirement is the manpower and matériel associated with the patrol areas headquarters and the HQ UNMO BH.

(a) Phase One. Liaison and reconnaissance; establish a headquarters (HQ UNMO BH), establish initial links and headquarters in patrol areas, identify principles for the concentration of heavy weapons, initiate the public relations campaign, receive and train reinforcements. All activities should be concurrent;

(b) Phase Two. Deployment of patrols; control the concentration of heavy weapons and conduct patrols throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina.

B. Manning requirement

18. Approximately 1,100 UMMOs with support elements. Details are contained in appendix E.

C. Timing

19. Phase One tasks should be started before 2 August 1992. This cannot be achieved using existing assets.

D. Administration and logistics

20. Details are contained in appendix B.

Appendices

A. Conflict areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina

B. Logistic support

C. Proposed patrol areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina

D. Operational command structure

E. UNMO manning requirements in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Appendix A

Conflict areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina



/...

Appendix B

Logistic support

HQ UNMO Zagreb

1. The current role of this headquarters will expand. Currently, it has operational command of Bihac and Dubrovnik, and administrative command of UNMOs deployed in Sectors East, West, North, South and Sarajevo.

2. Thé Bosnia and Herzegovina expanded mandate for UNPROFOR demands that it assume operational command of HQ UNMO BH, and seven patrol areas, within each of which patrol teams equipped with three vehicles will operate. The headquarters will be responsible for the reception and training of all new UNMOs at Zagreb. Additional tasks and related manpower required in HQ UNMO Zagreb are identified below.

Training

3. Assuming a deployment of 1,100 UNMOs, a training team will be required. Initial location of all training to be at Pleso, Zagreb. Should the new UNPROFOR headquarters location be more suitable, this will be adopted. The concept of training will be as designed for the induction of the 120 UNMOs for Sarajevo for the Pink Zones - a two-day package for most with additional medical training for some (see paras. 6-12 below).

4. The training task demands 10 experienced UNMO instructors. After the initial deployment of the Bosnia and Herzegovina UNMOs, this can be reduced to five, the latter figure being sufficient to train the expected turnover of established UNMOs in the mission area.

Administration

5. The requirement will be for an additional seven individuals to fulfil the administrative tasks. They can be military or civilian. They will be required during and beyond the deployment of the Bosnia and Herzegovina UNMOs to support the new establishment of mission UNMOs.

Medical support

6. Refresher training for all UNMOs in first aid to be included in the above programme.

7. Additional training for one UNMO in each vehicle (one in three), sufficient to sustain life for six hours, to be provided. This to supplement unknown medical support within Bosnia and Herzegovina.

8. Provision of one enhanced first aid pack per vehicle.

9. All above from existing British Medical Battalion resources.

10. Resources necessary to establish adequate medical presence at HQ UNMO BH are:

1 Senior Medical Liaison Officer (SMEDLO)
1 Nurse
3 Medics
2 Drivers
2 Signallers

1 (4 x 4) Jeep
2 Ambulances

11. Resources necessary to establish medical presence at each patrol area:

1 Driver
2 Medics
1 Ambulance

12. Total requirement based on one HQ UNMO BH and seven patrol areas is:

PERSONNEL/EQUIPMENT	HQ UNMO BH	7 X PATROL AREAS
SMEDLO	1	--
NURSE	1	--
MEDICS	3	14
DRIVERS	2	7
MECHANIC	1	--
SIGNALLER	2	--
JEEP	1	--
AMBULANCE	2	7

Interpreters

13. The HQ UNMO BH will require three interpreters, and each patrol and ECP two each. A total of 200 interpreters will be necessary. Provision for their accommodation and subsistence will be necessary.

Vehicles/communications

14. Telecommunications connections required for voice and fax at each patrol area and the HQ UNMO BH.

1 Car (light) - Senior Military Observer
3 (4 x 4) Jeeps per patrol team
2 (4 x 4) Jeeps per patrol area headquarters (one with winch)
2 (4 x 4) Jeeps per equipment-collection point
1 Computer
1 Printer
1 Fax
1 Generator
1 Base station of both VHF/HF
1 Handie-Talkie per vehicle (5 spares at patrol headquarters) plus veh charger assembly
1 INMARSAT

15. HQ UNMO BH will need to be equipped as per above plus the following:

2 Photocopiers
3 (4 x 4) Jeeps for UNMO headquarters (stand-by patrol)

16. Total requirement for the above items based on 7 patrol areas, 1 HQ UNMO BH, 62 ECPs, 24 patrol teams and an additional 17 patrols for Dubrovnik peninsular:

8 Cars (light)
354 (4 x 4) Jeeps (8 with winch)
8 Computers
8 Printers
8 Fax machines
8 Generators
8 Base stations of both VHF/HF
407 Handie-Talkies (1 per veh; 5 spare at Patrol HQ)
8 INMARSAT
2 Photocopiers

17. Each vehicle to be equipped to the following scale:

(a) Documentation

(i) Vehicle trip tickets (appropriately completed and authorized);

(ii) Insurance card;

(iii) Vehicle document holder;

(iv) Maintenance card.

(b) Equipment

(i) 1 VHF and HF vehicle-mounted set and antennae;

(ii) United Nations flag and pole and light;

(iii) Fire extinguisher;

(iv) 2 Jerry cans (full) of appropriate fuel;

(v) Battery jump leads;

(vi) Jack/brace and vehicle tool kit;

(vii) Tow rope;

(viii) Coolant in water bottle (full);

(ix) Set of snow chains;

(x) First aid kit;

(xi) Warning triangle;

(xii) Spare oil in suitable container;

(xiii) Internal map light;

(xiv) Cooker/lantern (same fuel);

(xv) Tents, 3-man;

(xvi) Rations/water;

(xvii) Shovels/axes;

(xviii) Fragmentation blankets for each team member.

18. Should weather conditions deteriorate during winter, and ECP and patrol teams be dispersed and isolated, there should be a requirement for over-snow vehicles. Two such vehicles would be necessary at each patrol area.

19. There will be a requirement for fuel at HQ UNMO BH in the initial stages, until local resources are identified. This could be a fuel pod vehicle with integral pump unit of up to 4,000-litres capacity.

20. Air support. There could be a requirement for air support for the following:

(a) As per paragraph 19 above should over-snow vehicles not be available;

(b) MEDEVAC;

(c) Routine (limited) resupply in difficult areas;

(d) Establishing communications (repeater sites);

(e) Command and control;

(f) Air reconnaissance.

Appendix C

Proposed patrol areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Note: The Dubrovnik area is included in the Bosnia and Herzegovina task.

/...

Appendix D

OPERATIONAL COMMAND STRUCTURE
UNMO - BH



Appendix E

UNMO manning requirements in Bosnia and Herzegovina

LOCATION	EQPT COL PTS	PATROL TEAMS	HQ	TOTALS
UNMO HQ			10	10
AREA 1	6 (6x6=36x2=72)	3 (3x3=9x3=27)	6	105
AREA 2	12 (12x6=72x2=144)	3 (3x3=9x3=27)	6	177
AREA 3	10 (10x6=60x2=120)	3 (3x3=9x3=27)	6	153
AREA 4	12 (12x6=72x2=144	6 (6x3=18x3=54)	6	204
AREA 5	8- (8x6=48x2=96)	4 (4x3=12x3=36)	6	138
AREA 6	8 (8x6=48x2=96)	3 (3x3=9x3=27)	6	129
AREA 7	6 (6x6=36x2=72)	2 (2x3=6x3=18) PENINSULA=50	6	146
TOTALS	62 (62x6=372x2=744)	24 (24x3=72x3=216) PENINSULA=50	52	1062

Notes:

1. The total number shown on the chart does not include the additional enhancement of 35 UNMOs required in Sector Sarajevo. This has been determined an operational necessity by Commander Sector Sarajevo. Therefore, the total UNMO requirement would be 1,097.

2. The chart has been designed on a building block format based on the following formula:

(a) Each site will have six UNMOs on it at any time because:

(i) The threat to security of UNMO lives dictates that a patrol team consist of a minimum of two vehicles with at least two crew in each;

(ii) There is a need for concurrent foot patrolling while manning vehicle-mounted communication equipment. Foot patrols will not be able to communicate over long ranges and hits can only be achieved from the vehicle;

(b) ECPs must be monitored 24 hours a day. Teams must be rotated in shifts of no more than 12 hours. Therefore there is a requirement for a second six-man team per site. Note that living conditions of the ECPs are likely to be very poor and UNMOs will have to return to a base location regularly;

(c) Each patrol team consists of a minimum of three vehicles with three UNMOs in each vehicle. As the operational situation improves and the details of the task and the terrain become clearer, patrols will be able to consist of single vehicles with two UNMOs;

(d) The above table includes 50 UNMOs for deployment to Dubrovnik area to monitor the proposed demilitarization.